Why did 3 JD relocate; compromise of Market Garden?

[SES (†)]

For those who are interested in these matters, it’s a well know fact that 3 JD relocated as indicated above on 17 SEP 1944. The GefStd of 3 JD (DIOGENES) was located just south of the German airfield Deelen near Arnhem. This was just north of the major drop zones for the gliders and airborne landings of Operation MARKET GARDEN.

On 17 SEP after gliders and paratroopers had landed literally almost on the doorsteps of the bunker, it was evacuated and the staff moved to the prepared alternate command post (Ausweichgefechtsstand) in the FLUKO at Duisburg, where they were operational the very same evening.

Hitherto I’ve heard 2 explanations for the rationale behind the evacuation:

1. In his post-war recollections the division commander Maj Gen. (MG) W. Grabmann has accounted that due to direct attacks, by heavy bombers and fighter-bombers, on the GefStd, the telephone lines were all cut, and it was impossible to perform either command or control of the subordinate forces, and it was impossible to compile an air picture. Consequently I JK gave the order to evacuation. Fact is that the GefStd was never directly attacked, as a matter of fact it was so close to the drop-zone that it was on the allied side of the bombline – to-day Forward Line own Troops (FLOT). I’ll explain a little later why Grabmann may have this recollection.

2. The telephone exchange incl. the Luftwaffe LV in downtown Arnhem was destroyed by a stray bomb, rendering all lines inoperative.

For the real story and the probable compromise of timing, objectives and drop zones of MARKET GARDEN please see:
http://www.gyges.dk/Why%20did%203%20JD% ... isburg.pdf
bregds
SES

[EricZ]

Moin,

Hat zwar nur indirekt etwas mit dem Thema Funkmeß zu tun, aber...
Nach diesem Beitrag wußten die Deutschen genau von der Luftlandung:

http://forum.wo2.nl/viewtopic.php?t=333 ... 511cf99e27

Grüße, Eric

[SES (†)]

Hi Eric,
Your Dutch is much better than mine, could you please hi-lighte where the german foreknowledge is described.
bregds
SES

[Marcel Hogenhuis]

Hello Eric and Ses,

I repeat my earlier comments to Ses that it is still debated whether the German commanders knew of the landings near Arnhem. A majority of historians however doubt, whether Arnhem was 'betrayed' though circumstancial evidents does suggest otherwise perhaps.

This circumstancial evidence is:
1. the Dutch spy nicknamed King Kong had been in Prince Bernhards headquarters in the two weeks before the landings and must have heard about airborne landings in the direction of Arnhem.
2. just before the allied airborne landings, the Germans reinforced the Flak near the bridges.

At 1. Major Kiesewetter (Abwehr) declared after the war that King Kong returned to him with the message that the Allies would use airborne troups in the near future. Information that was to vague to be of any use. There are NO important movements of Germans troups in anticipation of whatever airborne operation at all!
At 2. As the Allied ground forces already stood in Belgium near the Dutch border, it was a matter of military logica to strengthen the defense of the strategically important bridges. Yes, they reinforced the Flak near the Arnhem bridges, so everybody becomes blind to the fact that they also put extra Flak near the Venlo, Roermond, Moerdijk, Zaltbommel, Hedel and Nijmegen bridges.

Unless a diary shows up wherein Prince Bernhard or someone of his colleagues solemny have written that they disclosed all secrets to King Kong, I hardly doubt whether the alleged "Betrayal of Arnhem" can ever be proved!

All the best, Marcel

[SES (†)]

Hi Marcel,
That does still not explain why the Germans on 10 SEP 1944 decides to evacuate the GefStd of 3 JD by 17 SEP 1944 NLT 1100, and relocate to an Ausweich GefStd, from where it is very difficult to perform their functions and where it is very hard to find accomodation. I was the equivivalent of "I a" in a NATO command bunker for 5 years and belive me, such a decission is not taken unless you have hard intelligence indicating that it is a necessecity.
bregds
SES

[Marcel Hogenhuis]

Hello Ses,

I agree that there must have been an important reason for evacuation and there were: the strategic events on the ground.

On 15th August and 3rd September 1944 many airfields in the Netherlands (and several in Germany too) were heavily bombed. Paris was liberated 24th August 1944. The rapid rush north was continued: 1th September liberation of Antwerp. This green tsunami caused a chaotic retreat by the German armed forces.
More and more HQ 3.JD became a sort of lonely and vulnerable outpost west of the Third Reich. There was also a sort of panic.
The rumours alone that the first Allied troups had crossed the Belgium-Dutch border, was enough for a hasty evacuation of 3 main Luftwaffe airfields in southern Netherlands: Gilze-Rijen, Eindhoven and Venlo were evacuated on the 5th September. There are only 5 days between the 5th and 10th September...

One could certainly say that the decision for HQ 3.JD to move was perhaps a bit premature, on the other hand: preparing a new HQ and billeting the personell to operate that new HQ would take some time too. So, to me, the 10th of September - in the light what could be expected IF the Allied forces continued in the same speed - seems logical in a military sense and not the result of betrayal. I certainly do not close my eyes for the possibillity that King Kong's debriefing report might have add to the already existing Germans fears for an airborne operation but otherwise they could expect to be the next target for the Allied offensives.

All the best, Marcel

[EricZ]

Dear colleagues

the preperation of the new interim command post in Duisburg must have started sometime in summer 1944.

In some interviews several contemporary witnesses told me that already in the mid of August 1944 the Fluko Duisburg - originally situated in Duisburg-Kaiserberg - had been relocated to another facility in the nearby Duisburg-Duissern. This building was a former brewery and the Fluko was placed in a deep lying cellar.

The reason why these witnesses know this interesting aspect: the women came back to Duisburg from the Klein-Flukos Venray and Doetinchem in the Netherlands not knowing that the Haupt-Fluko Duisburg had been relocated. So when they came to Duisburg-Kaiserberg to take up their duty there were just unknown soldiers from an unknow unit.

Hereupon the women were told in a harsh way that they have to report to her supervisor at the new location in Duisburg-Duissern.

Cheers, Eric

[EricZ]

Moin,

muß ja nicht immer alles nur bierernst sein.

Es ist ja schon ein wenig zum Schmunzel, wenn man Texte über babelfish übersetzen läßt... einige kennen das sicherlich.

Hab über http://babelfish.altavista.com/ einfach mal meinen vorherigen Beitrag ins Deutsche übersetzen lassen, denn nicht jeder wird dieses "Fachchinesisch" verstehen.
Dabei ist folgendes herausgekommen:

Liebe Kollegen

das preperation des neuen Zwischenzeitsbefehl Pfostens in Duisburg muß an Sommer 1944 einmal begonnen haben. In einigen Interviews erklärten einige zeitgenössische Zeugen mir, daß bereits im mittleren von August 1944 das Fluko Duisburg - ursprünglich aufgestellt in Duisburg-Kaiserberg - zu einem anderen Service im nahe gelegenen Duisburg-Duissern verlagert worden war. Dieses Gebäude war eine ehemalige Brauerei und das Fluko wurde in einen tiefen liegenkeller gelegt. Der Grund, warum diese Zeugen diesen interessanten Aspekt kennen: die Frauen kamen zu Duisburg vom Klein-Flukos Venray und zu Doetinchem in den Niederlanden nicht wissend zurück, daß das Haupt-Fluko Duisburg verlagert worden war. So, als sie zu Duisburg-Kaiserberg kamen, ihre Aufgabe aufzunehmen, gab es gerade unbekannte Soldaten von einer unknow Maßeinheit. Darauf wurden die Frauen in einer rauhen Weise erklärt, daß sie ihren Inspektor an der neuen Position in Duisburg-Duissern berichten müssen.

Beifall, Eric

Die Sande der Zeit wurden durch den Fluß der konstanten Änderung abgefressen

Grüße, Eric

[SES (†)]

Hi all,
The process Eric describes, is part of prudent military planning. If in august 1944 3 JD did not have an Ausweich GefStd, it was high time . I agree with Marcel, the strategic and operational sitiation was in German disfavour. A German analysis of possible allied courses of action, could have resulted in the identification of an airborne landing across the Rhine as one option.
What strikes me is, that I JK decides to order the move before the Ausweich GefStd is ready for operations and before something as vital as accomodation has been arranged. You can argue, who cares about accomodation, "there is a war on, they can sleep in bivuaks". Caring for your people is a commanders responsibility and a simple question of operational effectiveness. If your people do not drink, eat and sleep they do not function effectively - if at all.
Why must the evacuation be completed by 1100 hours on 17 SEP 1944. Why not the day before and why not say two days later?
bregds
SES

[petzolde]

Zur automatisierten Übersetzung:
Ist doch etwas skurril, was dabei herauskommt. Eigentlich ganz lustig, aber wenn es um ernsthafte Dinge und/oder Geld geht, sollte man doch die Finger davon lassen.
Im Grunde hat sich in 10 Jahren nicht viel getan - damals gab es in einer US-Zeitung die Schlagzeile "The Gates to be Three in May". Das Programm übersetzte etwa so: "Im Mai werden 3 Tore sein". Gemeint war: Bei Bill Gates&Frau hatte sich Nachwuchs angekündigt, der im Mai erwartet wurde....
gruß EP